University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 3

Article 9

March 2022

Proving Racism: Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College and the
Implications on Defamation Law
Liam H. McMillin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts Commons, Evidence Commons, First
Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Liam H. McMillin, Proving Racism: Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College and the Implications on
Defamation Law, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2022)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/9

This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information,
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu.

McMillin: Proving Racism: Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College and the Impl

PROVING RACISM:
GIBSON BROS. INC. V. OBERLIN COLLEGE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS ON DEFAMATION LAW
Liam H. McMillin*

I. INTRODUCTION
Within a day of the election of Donald Trump in 2016, a seemingly
innocuous event occurred in the small college town of Oberlin, Ohio: an
Oberlin College student visited a local business, Gibson’s, and attempted
to use a fake ID to buy a bottle of wine, with two more bottles hidden
under his shirt.1 The man at the counter, Allyn D. Gibson Jr., confronted
the student, and although there are conflicting accounts of what happened
next, parties agree that Gibson Jr. chased the student out of the store, and
the two of them engaged in a physical altercation.2 The police arrived and
arrested the student, who is Black, and his two friends, also Oberlin
students.3
This incident is not the focus of this Casenote. Rather, this Casenote
examines the constitutional, racial, and legally-complicated questions that
arose from the protest and boycott that followed and the lawsuit filed by
Gibson’s4 against Oberlin College. The lawsuit ultimately asks the
question: is being called a “racist” actionable as a defamation claim? This
Casenote argues that for purposes of defamation law, “racist” is not a
verifiably false statement, and thus, should be considered constitutionally
protected opinion speech.
The case in question, Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College,5 sits on
appeal in the Ninth Appellate District of Ohio. Defendants Oberlin
College and then Dean of Students Meredith Raimondo (referred to
collectively as “Oberlin”) appealed the Lorain County Common Pleas
verdict, listing three assignments of error.6 Among other arguments,
* University of Cincinnati Law Review, Managing Editor. As an initial disclosure, the author would like
to note that he was enrolled at Oberlin College at the time these events took place and had lived in the
town for many years before, but this Casenote is based on the facts and law of the case itself, as filed, and
the author’s academic interpretation of such.
1. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 1, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. This Casenote uses “Gibson’s” to refer to the company and named plaintiff in this case. While
the key players in the company have the last name “Gibson,” the focus of this Casenote is on the business
itself.
5. Brief of Appellant Oberlin College at 1, Gibson Bros., Inc., et al., v. Oberlin College, et al.,
Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632, 9th Dist. (consolidated) (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
6. Id., Def.’s App. Br. 1.
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Oberlin contends the trial court erred by denying their motions for
summary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as for the
libel claim because the “student publications contained [constitutionally
protected] opinions, and Oberlin did not publish them.”7
This Casenote looks to defamation more generally and the
constitutional restrictions on defamation law before diving into the case
at hand. Part II first discusses defamation law and its interpretation in
Ohio, before turning to a discussion of the particulars of the Gibson Bros.,
Inc. v. Oberlin College case. Part III argues that being called a “racist”
cannot be a verifiable fact for the purposes of defamation law and then
looks at the trial court’s reasoning in this instant case before ultimately
arguing the Ninth District should reverse the trial court’s decision.
II. BACKGROUND
The American understanding and application of defamation law has
varied over time. This Part will first discuss defamation law generally
before turning to the constitutional limitations on defamation law. Then,
we turn to defamation law in Ohio, followed by the specifics of Gibson
Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College case itself.
A. Defamation, generally
Sometimes the best explications come from outside of the law. At the
outset of its discussion of defamation, the Supreme Court of the United
States in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. begins with Othello. Iago,
speaking to Othello, says:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash;
‘Tis something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.8

Iago, while not a lawyer himself—although some would posit that he has
the appropriate demeanor—touches on a key aspect of defamation: a
7. Id. Oberlin also appeals the denial of their motions for summary judgment and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference
claims, as well as the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, and the trial court’s failure to cap
damages. Id. While these issues are fascinating in their own right, given the political landscape of
Northeast Ohio, this Casenote focuses on more specific issues of this case.
8. 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act III, sc. 3, 1. 154-160).
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person’s reputation, or good name, can be stolen the same as coin. But,
unlike monetary assets, a person’s reputation is “the immediate jewel of
their souls;”9 it is personal and of utmost internal importance. The Court
in Milkovich writes “[d]efamation law developed not only as a means of
allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but also for the
purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such statements.”10 In
short, defamation law is intended to provide redress to people whose
reputation has been damaged by false statements.11
Generally, there are two categories of defamation: libel and slander.12
Libel is written defamation, while slander is spoken.13 At their core, both
forms consist of “[t]he publication of anything which is injurious to the
good name or reputation of another person, or which tends to bring him
into disrepute.”14 Over time, defamation has been understood to require a
false statement: “[i]njury to one’s reputation caused by another’s false
communication.”15 Defamation law falls under tort liability rather than
criminal culpability.
B. Constitutional Limitations on Defamation
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”16
As the plain language indicates, this Amendment focuses on preventing
Congress from enacting legislation that would limit speech, but the
Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan held the First Amendment
also limits the ability of the government to impose tort liability for
speech.17 If the government can impose liability for certain kinds of
speech, it would effectively be limiting speech.
In Sullivan, an elected commissioner for Montgomery, Alabama, sued
the New York Times for an advertisement it ran criticizing the
Montgomery police for their mistreatment of civil rights demonstrators.18
Although the advertisement included some false statements about the
events,19 the trial court instructed the jury that the statements were
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
paragraphs

Id.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12 (citing L. Eldredge, Law of Defamation 5 (1978)).
Id.
Defamation, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Defamation, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk Ed. 2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. I
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 258-59. (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two
were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery. Although Negro
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libelous per se, and that damages could be presumed.20 The jury awarded
a $500,000 verdict to Sullivan.21
The Supreme Court, however, held that holding the New York Times
civilly liable violated the First Amendment: “the Constitution delimits a
State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct.”22 The Court found the
statute in question “abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that
is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”23
The relevance of New York Times v. Sullivan to this Casenote is not
that Gibson’s occupies the same public status as the Montgomery
Commissioners, or a public official, but rather that Sullivan is the primary
example of the Supreme Court limiting the availability of tort liability
because of the First Amendment implications. Following Sullivan, the
Supreme Court made clear that these restrictions on tort liability are not
limited solely to public figures. In Gertz v. Welch, the Court drew a clear
line between “public” and “private” individuals and held the Sullivan
standard “defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the
context of defamation of a public person.”24 In so holding, the Court also
directed that states have an interest in “compensating injury to the
reputation of private individuals,” and therefore “the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”25
Although Sullivan provides the backdrop to this case—and is cited and
quoted regularly by Oberlin—if Gibson’s is considered private, rather
than public, then Gertz requires that state law govern the claims. Thus, an
examination of defamation law in Ohio is in order.
students staged a demonstration on the State Capitol steps, they sang the National Anthem and not ‘My
Country, 'Tis of Thee.’ Although nine students were expelled by the State Board of Education, this was
not for leading the demonstration at the Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the
Montgomery County Courthouse on another day. Not the entire student body, but most of it, had protested
the expulsion, not by refusing to register, but by boycotting classes on a single day; virtually all the
students did register for the ensuing semester. The campus dining hall was not padlocked on any occasion,
and the only students who may have been barred from eating there were the few who had neither signed
a preregistration application nor requested temporary meal tickets. Although the police were deployed
near the campus in large numbers on three occasions, they did not at any time ‘ring’ the campus, and they
were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, as the third
paragraph implied. Dr. King had not been arrested seven times, but only four; and although he claimed to
have been assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for loitering outside a courtroom, one
of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an assault.”).
20. Id. at 262. It is worth noting that the trial court in the case at issue in this Casenote also
instructed the jury that the statements were libelous per se, although incorrectly.
21. Id. at 278, n.18.
22. Id. at 283.
23. Id. at 268.
24. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
25. Id. at 343, 347.
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C. Defamation Law in Ohio
Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution reads, “Every citizen may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.” 26 These ideals,
“guided by the ‘profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’”
are “not only an integral part of the First Amendment Freedoms under the
federal Constitution but are independently reinforced in Section 11,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution . . .”27 In fact, “[t]he intent is to avoid
self-censorship, whereby overbroad defamation standards result in the
stifling of important non-defamatory material.”28 The Ohio Constitution
is specific in its intention to avoid overbroad defamation liability.
In Ohio, to establish a claim of libel, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that a false statement of fact was made,
(2) that the statement was defamatory,
(3) that the statement was published,
(4) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication,
and
(5) that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing
the statement.29

While all five elements are necessary for a successful claim, this Section
focuses primarily on the first element, that “a false statement of fact was
made.”30
If the statement made is not a fact, but rather an opinion, it cannot
support a libel claim because “an opinion as a matter of law cannot be
proven false.”31 Courts have held that opinions carry constitutional
importance, and “[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not the conscience of judges and juries but on the

26. OHIO CONST. art I, § 11.
27. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E. 2d 699, 702 (Ohio 1986) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
28. Id. at 245 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340).
29. Pollock v. Rashid, 690 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (formatting added for clarity).
It is worth mentioning—although discussed in more detail later in the Casenote—that initially Gibson’s
sued Oberlin for, among other things, libel and slander. The trial court granted Oberlin’s motion for
summary judgment as to the slander claim, but not the libel (which itself raises questions examined later),
but a Reader should rest assured that the similarities between actions for libel and slander allow for a
discussion of the solely the former that informs that latter. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739 (Lexis
2021).
30. Id.
31. Wampler v. Higgins,752 N.E.2d 962, 977 n.8, (Ohio 2001). Or, as an aspiring artist once said
to an aspiring poet (and the author’s father), “I can’t be wrong; I’m making it up.”
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competition of other ideas.”32 The legal system need not regulate
opinions; other, competing opinions will. Despite some qualifications of
the fact-opinion determination at the federal level,33 when analyzing a
libel claim, Ohio courts are to ask the question of whether the statement
should be categorized as a fact or an opinion.34
This determination of whether a statement is a fact or an opinion is of
utmost significance. If the statement is an opinion, generally, it is
“accorded absolute immunity from liability under the First
Amendment.”35 To determine whether a statement is a fact or an opinion,
“[t]he test . . . is an objective one based on a totality of circumstances and
on the specificity, verifiability, general context, and social context of the
words used.”36 The application of this test is expectedly broad. For
example, in Wampler v. Higgins the court writes:
. . . it is often appropriate to begin an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances by analyzing “the common usage or meaning of the
allegedly defamatory words themselves. We seek in this branch of our
analysis to determine whether the allegedly defamatory statement has a
precise meaning and thus is likely to give rise to clear factual implications.
A classic example of a statement with a well-defined meaning is an
accusation of a crime[,]” whereas “statements that are ‘loosely definable’
or ‘variously interpretable’ cannot in most contexts support an action for
defamation. . .” “Readers are . . . considerably less likely to infer facts
from an indefinite or ambiguous statement than one with a commonly
understood meaning.”37

Even at this initial stage of the analysis, the court uses at least three
different phrases to attempt to clarify the distinction: (1) the “common
usage” of the statement, (2) whether the statement “has a precise
meaning,” and (3) whether it “gives rise to clear factual implications.”38
Not surprisingly, and as discussed more in Part III, this distinction gets
fuzzy, and its importance makes the ambiguity all that much more
difficult to parse through. As exemplified by Gibson Bros., determining
whether a statement is a fact or an opinion is no simple ask of a court.

32. Id. at 967-68 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40).
33. For a thorough discussion of these developments, see Id. at 967-69.
34. Id. at 970.
35. Id. at 973 n. 4 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ohio 1986)) (internal
quotations omitted).
36. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ohio 2003) (citing Wampler,
752 N.E.2d at 977).
37. Wampler, 752 N.E.2d at 978 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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D. Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College
As mentioned briefly in Part I, this case arises out of a separate,
criminal case.39 On November 9, 2016, there was “an incident” involving
three Black Oberlin College students and an employee of Gibson’s Food
Market and Bakery.40 The white employee, Allyn D. Gibson Jr., suspected
one of the students of attempting to steal wine while purchasing a
different bottle of wine with fake identification.41 The employee
confronted the student, and pursued the student out of the store, across the
street, and into a nearby park, Tappan Square.42 As the trial court writes,
“[t]he details of the [ensuing] physical altercation are in dispute, but as a
result of the physical altercation, Mr. Gibson detained [the student] until
Oberlin police officers arrived on the scene.”43 After the arrival of the
police, only the students were arrested.44
That evening, other Oberlin College students began organizing a
protest outside the Gibson’s location.45 The protests began the next
morning and continued for two days.46 Per the trial court:
During the protest, protestors held signs, chanted, and distributed a flyer
that stated in part that Gibson’s is “a RACIST establishment with a LONG
ACCOUNT of RACIAL PROFILING and DISCRIMINATION.” Some of
the facts regarding distribution of the flyer are in dispute, but deposition
testimony was presented indicating protesters and Oberlin College staff
distributed copies of the flyer and/or utilized college copy machines to
make additional copies of the flyer. Also during the protests, [Defendant
Dean] Meredith Raimondo handed a copy of the flyer to Jason Hawk, a
reporter from the Oberlin News Tribune.47

39. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 2, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019). Before going further into the discussion of the
particulars of this case, it is worth mentioning that the facts referenced in this section come primarily from
the Judge John R. Miraldi’s “Entry and Ruling on Defendants Oberlin College and Meredith Raimondo’s
Motions for Summary Judgment.” Id. It is of utmost importance to recognize here that the facts listed
have not been presented to the jury. This Casenote relies on the trial court’s statement of facts solely in
an attempt to find a middle ground between the two parties. Whenever possible, this Casenote indicates
where there may be disagreement between the parties as to specific facts.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. See also Dustin Stephens, A protest against racism, and a $31.5 million defamation award,
CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oberlin-college-and-gibsonsbakery-a-protest-against-racism-and-a-31-5-million-dollar-defamation-award/
46. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 2, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
47. Id. Despite the acknowledged dispute, the judge includes mention of the deposition testimony
because this paragraph appears within a ruling on a motion for summary judgment presented by the
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The Flyer, emblazoned with the words “DON’T BUY,” asked the reader
to “PLEASE STAND WITH US,” and stated that “[a] member of our
community was assaulted by the owner of this establishment yesterday.”48

49

That evening, Oberlin College’s Student Senate, a student run
organization, passed a resolution supporting the boycott.50 It read:
Yesterday evening, reports of an incident involving employees of Gibson’s
Food Market and Bakery and current Oberlin College students began to
circulate. After further review today, consisting of conversations with
students involved, statements from witnesses, and a thorough reading of
the police report, we find it important to share a few key facts.
defendants, and is thus indicating a dispute of material fact. It is worth nothing, however, that later in this
ruling, the judge seems to accept this telling of events as true, rather than for purposes of summary
judgment.
48. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Appellants’ Brief at 7. Given the importance of this Flyer, it will remain capitalized
throughout this Note.
49. Complaint at 10, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No. 17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P.
(April 22, 2019).
50. Id.
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A Black student was chased and assaulted at Gibson’s after being accused
of stealing. Several other students, attempting to prevent the assaulted
student from sustaining further injury, were arrested and held by the
Oberlin Police Department. In the midst of all this, Gibson’s employees
were never detained and were given preferential treatment by police
officers.
Gibson[’]s has a history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of
students and residents alike. Charged as representatives of the Associated
Students of Oberlin College, we have passed the following resolution.51

The resolution continued by asking students to “immediately cease all
support, financial and otherwise, of Gibson’s Food Market and Bakery”
and called on Oberlin’s administrators to “condemn by written
promulgation the treatment of students of color by Gibson’s.” 52 This
resolution was posted in the Student Senate’s own locked bulletin board
in the student union on Oberlin’s campus.53
Nearly a year later, the Gibsons filed an eight-count suit against
Oberlin College and Dean Raimondo including, among others, one count
of libel and one of slander for the allegations that Gibson’s was a racist
establishment.54 On Oberlin’s motion for summary judgment, Judge John
Miraldi granted the motion as to two of the counts, including slander.55
The trial itself was bifurcated into two phases, one for compensatory and
one for punitive damages.56 In the compensatory phase, the jury found
against both Oberlin College and Dean Raimondo for the libel claim.57
The jury also found that the defendants did not act with “actual malice.”58
After their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were
denied, Oberlin appealed to the Ninth District Appellate Court.59 Oberlin

51. Id. at 7-8.
52. Id. at 8. Anecdotally, the author of the Casenote, who lived in Oberlin for two decades and
was attending Oberlin College at the time of these events, would note that beyond the contracts between
Oberlin College and Gibson’s for doughnuts and baked goods, most of Gibson’s business appeared to
come from members of the surrounding community who were not associated with the college.
53. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 2, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
54. Id. at 3. In total, the Gibson’s sued for (1) libel, (2) slander, (3) tortious interference with
business relationships, (4) tortious interference with contracts, (5) deceptive trade practices, (6) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (7) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and (8) trespass. Id.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Appellants’ Brief at 3.
57. Id.
58. Id. While not necessary for this Casenote’s discussion, this detail is included for those
defamation scholars who are interested in the context beyond this Note’s focus.
59. Id.
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argued: “Libel requires a false statement of fact published with the
requisite degree of fault by the defendant. As a matter of constitutional
law, both student publications [the Flyer and the Resolution] contained
opinions, and Oberlin did not publish them, let alone do so with malice.”60
After oral arguments in November of 2020, the parties now await a
decision from the Ninth District.
III. DISCUSSION
While the Ninth District has a wide range of questions before it, this
Casenote focuses now on a particular aspect of the case: can allegations
of racism be verifiable facts for the purposes of a defamation suit? First,
we examine semantics: is there a difference between being a racist and
being racist? Then, we ask whether either interpretation can be a
verifiable fact for the purposes of defamation law. Finally, we highlight
that this lawsuit could be seen as just another in a long line of cases where
plaintiffs attempt to use defamation suits to silence those who speak about
their racist acts.
In its appellate brief, Oberlin argues “[a]llegations of ‘racist’ behavior
are subjective and unverifiable descriptions of one’s experiences and
perceptions.”61 Looking to Wampler, Oberlin submits that in most
situations, terms that are “loosely definable” or “variously interpretable”
cannot support an action for defamation.62 Indeed, Ohio courts have held
that “accusations of ethnic bigotry are not actionable.”63
The crux of Oberlin’s argument, specific to this issue, rests on the fact
that the trial judge asked whether the term “racist” is “pejorative,” rather
than if it is a verifiable fact:
The trial court erred by asking whether “racist” is “pejorative,” rather than
whether it is factual. Whether a statement is negative—and thus
defamatory—has nothing to do with whether it is a verifiable statement of
fact. An accusation of racism is a viewpoint, not a data point. Indeed, in the
context of a protest in which students and other community members
shared their subjective experiences, these accusations are classic

60. Id. at 1.
61. Id. at 14 (citing to Lennon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Juvenile Court, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86651,
2006-Ohio-2587, ¶31; Condit v. Clermont Cty. Rev., 675 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)).
62. Id. (quoting Wampler v. Higgins, 752 N.E.2d 962,978 (Ohio 2001)).
63. Condit, 675 N.E.2d at 478 ((“the word ‘fascist’ is ‘loose[]’ and “ambiguous and cannot be
regarded as a statement of fact because of the ‘tremendous imprecision’ of meaning and usage of the
term”) citing to Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 891-895 (2nd Cir. 1976); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d
394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (the term "racist" is "hurled about so indiscriminately that it is no more than a
verbal slap in the face . . . not actionable unless it implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory facts")).
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expressions of opinion.64

For purposes of a defamation suit, if someone calling another person a
“racist” is a viewpoint, as Oberlin argues, then it should be considered an
opinion, not a verifiable fact, entitled to First Amendment protection.
A. Racism as a Fact
Oberlin’s argument presents us with important and difficult questions:
for the purposes of defamation law, can a person be a racist? For a
defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove the defendant made a false
statement of fact. How should courts determine whether or not an
accusation of racism is true or false?65 This Section looks at whether
racism can be “true” given its subjective nature. Section B then asks
whether or not it is a fact that can be verified.
The difficulty here, of course, is that racism is deep-seated because
“Americans believe in the reality of ‘race’ as a defined, indubitable
feature of the natural world.”66 But racism is not only deep-seated but also
multi-layered. On its page titled, “Being Antiracist,” the National
Museum of African American History & Culture lays out four types of
racism: individual racism, interpersonal racism, institutional racism, and
structural racism.67 Individual racism “refers to the beliefs, attitudes, and
actions of individuals that support or perpetrate racism in conscious and
unconscious ways.”68 Interpersonal racism includes public expressions of
racism between individuals.69 Institutional racism involves
“discriminatory treatments, unfair policies, or biased practices based on
race [within an organization] that result in inequitable outcomes for
whites over people of color . . .”70 These three types of racism all fit
within, and contribute to, structural racism, “the overarching system of
racial bias across institutions and society.”71
64. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Appellants’ Brief at 15 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). On first glance, it
does appear that the trial judge does misstate that law here. On second glance, this Author comes to the
same conclusion as the first.
65. This Casenote is admittedly and purposefully narrow in its discussion of racism within
defamation law. The Author is aware of the limitations of such a discussion in the confines of this
Casenote, as well as his own limitations, and intends to remark primarily on the facts of the case at hand,
rather than the extensive and important discussion of systemic racism’s impact and existence within the
law more generally.
66. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 7 (2015).
67. Being Antiracist, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY & CULTURE,
https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/being-antiracist (last visited Mar. 24, 2021).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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These types of racism are not solely overt or intentional, but sadly, they
often are now more than ever. As recounted by a Capitol Police Officer
Harry Dunn during the January 6, 2021 insurrection, “I got called a [nword] a couple dozen times today protecting this building. . . Is this
America?”72 Sadly, the answer to Dunn’s question is “yes,” and the
overtness of that racism is not limited to such extreme moments.
But the nature of racism in America is that it is often inherent, implicit.
Explicit intention is not required for an act to be racist. As Ta-Nehisi
Coates writes, referring to the portrayal of the boys in “The Dukes of
Hazzard” as “two outlaws, driving a car named the General Lee, must
necessarily be portrayed as ‘just some good ole boys, never meanin’ no
harm.”73 Coates continues:
But what one “means” is neither important nor relevant. It is not necessary
that you believe that the officer who choked Eric Garner set out that day to
destroy a body. All you need to understand is that the officer carries with
him the power of the American state and the weight of an American legacy,
and they necessitate that of the bodies destroyed every year, some wild and
disproportionate number of them will be black.74

The difficulty Coates identifies here is that racism is so often not an
intentional, conscious act. That is not to say that overt, intentional racism
does not happen frequently, but rather that this more covert racism exists
both subconsciously in the form of inherent bias as well as silently,
internally. These “quiet” forms of racism are harder to spot on their face—
yet, these quiet forms are those that perpetrate institutional and systemic
racism and are often bubbling so close to the surface that it takes little
effort for them to go from covert to overt.
As Richard Thompson Ford writes, “state of mind is not the sine qua
non of wrongful discrimination. A decision can be motivated by bias but
not be discriminatory,” and “invidious discrimination need not involve
bias or animus.”75 As Ford writes, “the most obvious type of
discrimination is facial discrimination,” which is “a policy that explicitly
assigns preferences or shabby treatment on the basis of race.”76 While it
72. Pierre Thomas, Victor Ordonez, and Eliana Larramendia, Capitol Police officer recounts Jan.
6 attack: Exclusive, ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2021, 11:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/capitolpolice-officer-recounts-jan-attack-exclusive/story?id=76036587.
73. Coates, supra note 66 at 103.
74. Id.
75. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD 180 (2008). It is worth mentioning that Ford’s
theory has received criticism from other critical race theorists, and specifically for his acknowledgement
of institutional racism, or “racism without racists” as he calls it, but his suggestion that connecting
individuals to these larger forms of racism is “playing the race card.” See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94
Iowa L. Rev. 1589, 1636, (2008-2009). As Cho notes, Ford’s approach “to achieve integration caters to
white normativity and sets a high bar for determining actually-existing racists.” Id. at 1637.
76. Ford, supra note 75.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/9

12

McMillin: Proving Racism: Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College and the Impl

2022]

PROVING RACISM

1033

might be the most obvious, it is also the rarest, says Ford, “[b]ecause the
law flatly forbids it with very few exceptions, few people pass facially
discriminatory laws or adopt facially discriminatory policies.” 77 This too
applies to individuals: while facial, open racism still occurs all too
regularly, it is usually easy for others to see. The quiet racism is more
subtle.
Ford also recognizes that while the motivations of actors, including
those engaging in quiet racism, may be helpful in examining
discriminatory actions, discriminatory intent is ultimately cyclical.
Referring to the Supreme Court case Palmer v. Thompson, where the town
of Jackson, Mississippi closed all of its public swimming pools rather than
integrating them, Ford noted:
[t]he decision [to close all the pools] has a discriminatory effect because of
its social meaning. That social meaning is a statement that blacks are
inferior and their presence will ruin the public pools. But that statement
doesn’t injure Jackson’s black population because they might be convinced
that it’s true; it injures them directly because they will, correctly, believe
that other people believe it. The direct injury is not that of propaganda, it
is that of an insult. And an insult is insulting because it reflects the
speaker’s attitudes—her intent.78

For Ford, a discriminatory effect is linked to discriminatory intent, even
in situations where the effect is not blatant. In Palmer, in theory, the
decision to close all the pools has an equal effect on both the white and
Black people of Jackson, but as Ford argues, this effect is embroiled with
the discriminatory intent, through its social meaning. Quiet racism, we
can elaborate, is not always so obvious.
This is the difficulty for defamation law: quiet racism, whether
conscious or subconscious, is difficult to prove as a verifiable fact. As
stated above, to sufficiently support a defamation claim, the plaintiff must
show that a false statement of fact was made.79 The statement must be
both “false,” and “of fact.” In theory, a person accused of being racist
could claim that their action was not internally motivated by race. For
example, if a white man who killed six women of Asian descent is
accused of being racist, is it enough for him to say that the killings were
not motivated by race?80 Or, could a white cop who killed a black woman
77. Id. Ford is writing here primarily about government action, but his reasoning here also applies
to private individuals.
78. Id. at 183 (original emphasis).
79. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ohio 1986) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
80. Atlanta Shooting Suspect Says Sex Addiction, Not Racial Hatred, Spurred Attack, VOA NEWS
(March 19, 2021 2:13 AM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/atlanta-shooting-suspect-says-sex-addictionnot-racial-hatred-spurred-attack. This, of course, is an even more complicated issue, given the
fetishization of Asian women.
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in her own bedroom say that the shooting “was not a race thing,” and
therefore arguments that he is a racist are false because of his internal
mindset?81 In each of these examples, whether the racism is individual,
interpersonal, or institutional, if either of these white men brought a
defamation suit against someone who called them a racist, would the court
be willing to accept their own statements that they were not motivated by
race? Should the court give any weight at all to these men’s mental state
when determining whether the statement made was false? Put another
way, does the consideration of mental state automatically make the
statement an opinion, or can it still be a fact?
The flipside of the coin poses additional difficulty. A person may
experience racism from another person, even if the latter person had no
intention of being, nor any idea that their actions were, racist. Is this
person still a racist? With the permeation of institutional and systemic
racism in the United States, racist acts occur every day where the
perpetrator claims not to be racially motivated. But those acts are still
affecting people of color and are built on systemic racism. Take, for
example, microaggressions. Columbia Professor Derald Wing Sue, PhD,
said that “[i]t’s a monumental task to get white people to realize that they
are delivering microaggressions, because it’s scary to them.”82 He
continues, “[i]t assails their self-image of being good, moral, decent
human beings to realize that maybe at an unconscious level they have
biased thoughts, attitudes and feelings that harm people of color.”83
Similarly, there are many studies where:
. . . well-intentioned whites who consciously believe in and profess equality
unconsciously act in a racist manner, particularly in ambiguous
circumstances. In experimental job interviews, for example, whites tend
not to discriminate against black candidates when their qualifications are
as strong or as weak as whites'. But when candidates' qualifications are
similarly ambiguous, whites tend to favor white over black candidates, the
team has found.84

Even white people who profess equality fall into racist habits and actions.
And these situations are objectively racist: the outcomes and decisions
were motivated by race, but there is no verifiably intentional racism.
In Gibson Bros., when Oberlin students accuse Gibson’s of being a

81. Breonna Taylor: Officer in shooting says it ‘was not a race thing’, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54634793.
82. Tori DeAngelis, Unmasking ‘racial micro aggressions’, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 42
(Feb. 2009), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/02/microaggression.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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“racist establishment,”85 is it enough for Gibson’s to say, “No, we’re not
racist”? Is such a response enough for people of color who have
experienced what they perceive to be racist acts perpetrated by Gibson’s?
When determining whether or not Gibson’s is racist, and thus if the
statement in the Flyer is not false, should the trial court have examined
the experience of Gibson’s or those who have experienced the racism?
Should the court look to both? Can subjective experience be the
foundation for a fact, as opposed to the more logical description as an
opinion?
Clearly, there is a hole in defamation law. And most defamation suits
filed on behalf of plaintiffs accused of being racist fall into this “quiet”
racism category.86 Courts cannot rely on the internal mental states of
plaintiffs to determine if they were racially motivated. Whether the racism
is internal and personal, or inherent and systematic, or both, proving a
racist state of mind is difficult. Similarly, a person may perform racist acts
without ever being aware that their actions are racist. There may even be
times when an action was inherently motivated by race, but both the
perpetrator and the victim were unaware that it was. Does racism require
one of the players, either perpetrator or victim, to perceive the racism?
How are courts expected to balance this when ruling on a defamation
claim? In these instances of quiet racism, how are courts expected to
determine whether the statement that “this person is a racist” is true or
false, for purposes of the first prong of a defamation claim? What should
they look to?
B. “Racist” as a Verifiable Statement
In the fact versus opinion distinction, it is now worth noting that the
existence of two differing experiences of the same action should swing
the lever swiftly towards that of opinion and thus also towards
constitutional protection. Can something be a “fact” if there are two
differing internal views on it?87 Each party has their own experience of
the event, and both parties are “correct” in their own internal
interpretation, but they are fully subjective interpretations. To be a “fact”
within defamation law, it must be an “objective” interpretation. This
certainly supports the argument that “racist” is a statement of opinion,

85. Complaint at 10, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No. 17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P.
(April 22, 2019).
86. See, e.g., Webber v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 103 N.E.3d 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017); Lennon
v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 2006-Ohio-2587, 8th Dist. (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Gueye v. U.C.
Health, No. 1:13-cv-673, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141834 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Butler v. City of Cincinnati,
No. 1:17-cv-00604, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132032 (S.D. Ohio 2020).
87. Criminal defense lawyers certainly would say so.
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rather than fact.
But the difficulty does not end so easily there, compounded by the
observation we are still in only the first element of defamation. In a
defamation claim, the statement made must not only be false, but it must
also be a verifiable fact. Given the subjective nature of the word “racist”88
what would a court use to verify the existence of racism for this fact?
Need there be intent by the actor? Or experience by the receiver? We need
not mirror the argument made in the Section above, given the similarity,
but it is worth noting explicitly that this second question has the same
difficulties as the first.
C. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Applied
In the instant case, the trial court held the language in the Flyer and the
Resolution were facts, and not opinions for purposes of defamation law.89
Judge Miraldi applies a four-factor analysis to determine whether the
statements were protected opinions.90 The factors are: (1) the “specific
language used”; (2) “[w]hether the statement in question is verifiable”;
(3) the “general context of the statement”; and, (4) the “broader context
in which the statement appeared.”91
Applying the first factor to the Flyer, Judge Miraldi held “[t]he specific
language that ‘[Gibson’s] is a racist establishment with a long account of
racial profiling and discrimination’ is pejorative.”92 He made the same
determination as to the Resolution: “[t]he accusations of racism,
racialized violence, and a history of discrimination along with the
implication that students of color are met with hate are pejorative.”93
This is not entirely accurate. While there are many factors listed in
Scott, none involve whether or not a statement is “pejorative.”94 Instead,
Scott, relied on by Judge Miraldi, described the “specific language” factor
more akin to “common usage.”95 The “specific language factor” used by
the Scott court is not meant to determine whether the statement was
pejorative, but rather whether a court can infer a clear statement of fact

88. As discussed supra, Part III(A).
89. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 9, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (Ohio 1986)).
92. Id. (original capitalization re-formatted).
93. Id. at 15.
94. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ohio 1986). In fact, the word “pejorative” does
not appear once in the Scott opinion.
95. Id.
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from the common interpretation of words used.96 Even if we applied this
incorrect “pejorative” factor, many courts think the word “racist” is too
“watered down” to be the source of a defamation claim.97
As for the second factor, whether the statement is verifiable, Judge
Miraldi focused on the Flyer’s use of the words “long account” but does
so in a somewhat strange manner.98 The sentence in question in the
Flyer—and similar language and interpretation in the Resolution—reads
that Gibson’s has a “long account of racial profiling and
discrimination.”99 Judge Miraldi then remarked that “a noted synonym for
account is the word history.”100 He then provides the Webster definition
for “history” as “an established record,”101 which he uses to skew the
statement in the Flyer as imputing on the publisher “knowledge of a
documented past history of such activity.”102
Before turning to the more pressing question of the difficulties of
verifying racism as a fact, it is worth noting that if Judge Miraldi had
simply looked to the definition of the word “account”, which was
included in the Flyer verbatim, Webster’s would have told him that
“account” actually has its own definition: “a statement or exposition of
reasons, causes, or motives.”103 This definition touches on intention and
other internal forces that, if applied as it should have been, changes the
analysis considerably.
But even if we play out Judge Miraldi’s interpretation, what would it
96. Id. In Scott, the court inferred a statement that “H. Donald Scott committed perjury” from
“some nine sentences and a caption” which implicated that Scott “lied at the hearing after having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth.” Id.
97. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Accusations of ‘racism no longer
are ‘obviously and naturally harmful.’ The word has been watered down by overuse, becoming common
coin in political discourse. . . . Language is subject to levelling forces. When a word acquires a strong
meaning it becomes useful in rhetoric. A single word conveys a powerful image. When plantation owners
held blacks in chattel slavery, when 100 years later governors declared ‘segregation now, segregation
forever,’ everyone knew what a ‘racist’ was. The strength of the image invites use. To obtain emotional
impact, orators employed the term without the strong justification, shading its meaning just a little. So
long as any part of the old meaning lingers, there is a tendency to invoke the word for its impact rather
than to convey a precise meaning. We may regret that the language is losing the meaning of a word,
especially when there is no ready substitute. But we serve in a court of law rather than of language and
cannot insist that speakers cling to older meanings. In daily life ‘racist’ is hurled about so indiscriminately
that it is no more than a verbal slap in the face; the target can slap back. It is not actionable unless it
implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory facts, and Stevens has not relied on any such
implication.”).
98. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 10, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College,
No. 17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added for clarity).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Account,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/account
(accessed Mar. 26, 2021).
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mean to have a documented history of racism as a verifiable fact? As
discussed above, there is difficulty in designating racism as a fact and
verifying that fact.104 In his analysis, Judge Miraldi applied Scott to the
question of whether the statement made in the Flyer was a verifiable fact:
“the Supreme Court of Ohio in Scott stated “[i]f an author represents that
he has private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the opinion he
expresses, the expression of opinion becomes as damaging as an assertion
of fact.”105 Judge Miraldi reasoned that the language in the Flyer, the
“long account of racial profiling and discrimination,” is akin to the
assertion that there exists an established record of these racist acts: “the
accusation that Gibson’s has a ‘long account of racial profiling and
discrimination’ goes beyond implication and directly tells the reasonable
reader that the author’s previous statement . . . is supported by a lengthy
and potentially documented record of racial profiling and
discrimination.”106 For Miraldi, the implication of this record is what
makes the statement defamatory: “[t]he implication of the undisclosed
facts supporting the statements of the flyer make them damaging as an
assertion of fact.”107
This argument is severely lacking. Judge Miraldi has first handpicked
a tenuous synonym, relied on that definition as gospel, and then
misapplied the law to that incorrect definition. Miraldi seems to be
arguing that the phrase “long account” insinuates to a “reasonable reader”
that there exists a “clear established record of verifiable instances of racial
profiling and discrimination.” Or, in other words, there is an implication
of possible defamatory statements, undisclosed, but verifiable, and these
implied-undisclosed-and-verifiable statements are contained in an
established record, all contained in the words “long account.”
The previous sentence is nearly unreadable, purposely so; Judge
Miraldi’s argument is so convoluted and complex that it is difficult to put
simply. The paradox of his argument is perhaps best exemplified in a
single sentence: “[t]he implication of the undisclosed facts supporting the
statements of the flyer make them as damaging as an assertion of fact.”108
Here, Miraldi states that undisclosed facts are implied, which makes them
as damaging as if they were assertions of fact. But as he concedes in the
same sentence, they are not assertions of fact: they are implied,
undisclosed facts. Miraldi relies on Scott to argue that the author of the

104. See, supra, Part III, Section A.
105. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 9, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, No.
17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019) (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707
(Ohio 1986)).
106. Id. (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Flyer has “private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the opinions
he expresses.”109 But as Scott (and Miraldi) note, where this statement
“lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not
believe the statement has specific factual content.”110 Miraldi quotes this
specific line, but then ignores it in his analysis. He implies that the
“plausible method of verification” is the “length and potentially
documented record of racial profiling and discrimination.”111 But this
“record” he refers to is based on his false equivalency between the words
“account” and “history.” Even by his own reading, there is a substantial
difference between the “implication of . . . undisclosed facts” and a
“documented record of racial profiling and discrimination.”112 If, under
Scott, the analysis hinges on a “plausible method of verification,” there is
a vast difference between the plausibility of implied, undisclosed facts,
and a documented record.
Even if we humor Judge Miraldi and accept momentarily that a
defamation claim can be based on a statement that there exists other
defamatory facts, we are left with the same problem. Say there is a
“documented record of racial profiling and discrimination”; each instance
in that “record” has the same problem detailed above: it is a subjective
experience. To verify the existence of a record, in theory, the court would
need to look at each individual instance on that record and determine
whether or not it was actually racist. And then we fall again into our same
issue, that verifying racism as a fact, especially for the purposes of
defamation, is nearly impossible.
So, even humoring Judge Miraldi as to the Flyer, his reasoning is left
no better. The basis of the defamatory statement, in Miraldi’s mind, is the
“long account of racial profiling.” This is the verifiable fact required for
a defamation claim. Yet, even that “verifiable fact” is only itself a fact if
it contains verifiable instances of racism. The reasoning catches its own
tail, only to turn itself inside-out.
As for the Student Senate’s Resolution, Judge Miraldi applies much of
the same analysis. While there are fewer definitional hoops to jump
through this time—the Senate Resolution does state that, “Gibson’s has a
history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of students and
residents alike”113—Judge Miraldi’s reasoning fails for the same reasons
as above: this “history,” like the long account, is theoretically full of
subjective, unverifiable statements.
109. Id. (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707).
110. Scott, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707.
111. Entry and Ruling on Def.’s Mot. Summ. Judg. at 10, Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College,
No. 17-CV-193761, Lorain Cty. C.P. (April 22, 2019).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 15.
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While Judge Miraldi relies, partially, on Scott to conclude the writers
of the Flyer and the Resolution are implying that they each have firsthand knowledge that substantiates the opinion, which makes the opinion
a fact for the purposes of defamation law, a slightly further reading of
Scott renders this argument useless. As stated in Scott, the implication of
first-hand knowledge must have a “plausible method of verification.”114
In each instance, the record Miraldi refers to is not verifiable in the first
place, let alone “plausibly” so. As mentioned in the Sections above,
verifying instances of racism to the degree required to call them a “fact”
is nearly impossible. It is incredibly subjective. And without this plausible
method of verification, Judge Miraldi’s conclusion loses all strength.
These statements are not facts, but opinions, and thus are constitutionally
protected. Hopefully, Ohio’s Ninth District will see this hole and render
judgment for Oberlin.
IV. CONCLUSION
While this Casenote has focused primarily on one particular case, and
the hole in defamation law the case hinges on, there are larger
ramifications. As the NAACP notes in their amicus brief filed in the
Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College case, using tort law, such as
defamation, to silence the voices of those fighting for civil rights has a
long history in this country.115 In cases such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan116 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware117 the Supreme Court
“recognized this tactic for what it was: an attempt to silence and
intimidate civil rights leaders through the misuse of the court system.”118
This Casenote is not insinuating any motive of discriminatory intent on
behalf of the Gibsons for filing this suit.119 But the questions raised by the
suit that they did file have a larger impact. As the NAACP writes,
“[u]pholding liability for Oberlin College in this case would be a sharp
departure from the long-settled understanding of the First Amendment [.
. .] and upend the protections for free speech that the NAACP has worked

114. Scott, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
115. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Amicus Brief filed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), 2.
116. 376 U.S. 253 (1964).
117. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
118. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Amicus Brief filed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), 2.
119. This is, after all, only a law review article, and if a court holds that calling someone a racist
can be the basis for a defamation claim, a writer must tread lightly.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/9

20

McMillin: Proving Racism: Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College and the Impl

2022]

PROVING RACISM

1041

to secure for over sixty years.”120 Looking back to the civil rights
movement and the continued fight for racial equality, “civil liability–
when not carefully circumscribed—can easily become an impermissible
limitation of free speech.”121
That, truly, is what is at stake here. If a defamation claim can be based
on someone calling another person a racist, civil liability becomes the
basis to silence voices. The majority of this Casenote has focused on the
impossibility, legally, of racism being a verifiable fact, namely the
subjective nature of which makes it unverifiable. But it is this same notion
that fuels the policy rationale: allowing those—especially those in
power—who do not see their actions or words as racist to be protected by
civil liability from being called a racist inhibits any potential progress as
we fight for racial equality.
As a matter of law, being called a racist should not be the basis of a
defamation claim. As a matter of justice, it cannot.

120. Gibson Bros. Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 and 20CA011632 (consolidated),
(9th Dist. 2020), Amicus Brief filed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), 13.
121. Id.
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